U
nited States Army newsreel footage of the devastated landscapes of German cities provides one of the most enduring images of the Second World War. The pictures of gutted buildings and rubblelled streets offer a stark testament to the ultimate failure of the Luftwaffe in protecting the German homeland from aerial attack. In the course of the war the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) obliterated entire sections of major German industrial and population centres under a hail of high explosive and incendiary bomb loads. Operating largely at night, the RAF launched its 'bomber streams' against Germany's major industrial and urban centres in a strategy of area bombardment designed to 'dehouse' the German population and break its will to ght. In January 1943 the USAAF nally joined the RAF in raids against Germany by focusing on a strategy of daylight 'precision' bombardment aimed at the heart of German industrial production. During the course of the air cam-paign against the Third Reich, tens of thousands of British and American bombers pounded targets within Germany with over 1 200 000 tons of bombs. 1 In the end, Allied bombing within Germany killed an estimated 300 000 civilians, wounded an additional 780 000 persons and destroyed 3 600 000 dwellings. 2 In an attempt to protect the Third Reich from aerial attack, the Luftwaffe employed a variety of active and passive defensive measures. The overwhelming tendency to focus solely on the performance of the ghters and/or ak provides only one piece of the air defence mosaic, and has led to a widespread under-appreciation of the contributions of other organizations within the Luftwaffe's air defences. For example, the activities of the Luftwaffe's dummy installations (Scheinanlagen) and measures used to decoy bombers away from their designated objectives have received scant attention in the majority of histories. The dummy installations and decoy measures experienced varying degrees of success throughout the con ict, but at times they proved instrumental in luring a high percentage of RAF and USAAF aircraft away from their intended targets.
Many at the upper echelons of the Luftwaffe leadership, including Reich Marshal Hermann Göring, the commander of the Luftwaffe, and Field Marshal Erhard Milch, state secretary for aviation and the number two ranking of cer in the Luftwaffe, demonstrated a limited understanding of the broader outlines and effectiveness of Germany's ground-based air defences. These men were repeatedly guilty of evaluating the performance of the Luftwaffe's air defences using a simple binomial equation that compared ak versus ghter performance. This myopic focus on ghters versus ak led the Luftwaffe's leadership consistently to ignore or grossly underestimate the contributions of other elements of the ground-based air defences. In fairness to the Luftwaffe, British and American intelligence of cers also were guilty of underestimating the performance of German ground-based air defences, and it was only through the efforts of the Allied Operational Research Section (ORS) that these views changed by the end of the war. Still, many Luftwaffe leaders often failed to recognize the outstanding returns achieved by decoy and deception measures at a relatively low level of investment, despite the large number of British and American bombs that fell on these sites at various times throughout the war.
I
Despite the extensive resources devoted to the creation of a massive ak force and the Luftwaffe's day and night ghter forces, one of the greatest successes achieved by the anti-aircraft air defences in the early stage of the war involved the construction of numerous dummy installations throughout the Reich. In early July 1940 the commander of air region 3, General (shortly thereafter Field Marshal) Hugo Sperrle, ordered the construction of industrial dummy installations throughout his command. Furthermore, he directed the building of these dummy installations 'without consideration to personnel, materials, and capital expenditure'. 3 The urgency in Sperrle's order resulted from two factors. First, at the start of the war Göring had opposed the creation of a night ghter force, and it was not until mid-1940 that he nally ordered the establishment of two Gruppen of approximately 27 aircraft each as a dedicated night ghter force. 4 Second, as late as December 1940, the ak arm was experiencing substantial dif culties in successfully tracking and engaging RAF bombers at night.
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The idea of using mock installations and facilities to simulate their operational counterparts was not new. In fact the German military considered building dummy industrial structures in the First World War, and the Luftwaffe introduced dummy installations as a measure to protect their air force during war-game simulations against the French in the winter of 1934-35. 6 The Luftwaffe's objective was to build dummy installations that looked similar to and were located close enough to existing industrial and military sites to confuse British bomber crews. By mid-July construction crews nished building one of the rst dummy installations in the vicinity of Augsburg.
7 Soon thereafter dummy installations appeared outside of Stuttgart and Karlsruhe. By the end of the year there were 11 dummy installations in the vicinity of Hamburg alone.
8 Table 1 lists dummy installations in air district VII that were in operation by the rst week of August 1940. Luftwaffe construction teams went to great lengths to deceive the RAF pilots into believing that these were actual targets. They constructed replica buildings, factory facilities, railway stations and even streetcar lines, including devices to simulate the electric sparks gener- ated in the overhead lines by the passage of a streetcar. 10 They also placed ak guns and searchlights around the targets. In order to lure RAF crews to the phoney target, the facilities were poorly lighted to make it appear as if the lighting was a product of sloppy blackout procedures. In addition, ak guns commenced ring and searchlights scanned the skies upon the approach of British aircraft in order to draw their attention away from the actual target towards the fake. The Luftwaffe also detonated pyrotechnics at the fake sites to simulate bomb bursts in a further effort to divert approaching aircraft to the site.
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On 6 August 1940 air district VII headquarters released several guidelines for the operation of the dummy installations. First, the directive emphasized that the ak batteries and the searchlight units should conduct their activities in such a manner as to convince the bomber crews that they were protecting a vital installation. The second guideline called for ak forces to change their positions at regular intervals in an effort to exaggerate their true strength; however, the directive cautioned that the ak forces should not overdo it lest the bombers choose to avoid the area. Finally, the air district headquarters guidelines discouraged ak operations during the day, as the chance of duping the bomber crews in daylight conditions was dramatically less than at night.
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At rst, RAF crews appeared adept at distinguishing between the real and the fake installations. In one respect ak batteries apparently showed their hand through a too-obvious display of gunnery. German interrogations of British prisoners of war found that several remarked on the 'extraordinary ring displays' in the vicinity of the dummy installations. In the period between 26 July and 9 August 1940, British aircraft ew over several of the installations even releasing ares, but not their bomb loads. 13 By the middle of August, however, RAF bombers increasingly began bombing the phoney sites, leading the Luftwaffe to believe that the deception was working.
14 By the middle of September the improved success of the dummy installations led to the construction of several new sites. However, the effectiveness of the dummy installations proved to be a two-edged sword. This was the case for a small town in the vicinity of one site whose mayor complained that these deceptive measures increased the risk of collateral damage to his village. The mayor's request to have the site relocated was denied, but the Luftwaffe noted that it was important to provide small communities near the sites with timely air-raid warnings. 15 It is not surprising that the mayor's protest fell on deaf ears as interest in the deception scheme could be found at the highest levels of the Luftwaffe leadership. In fact, both Göring and Milch suggested improvements to the operations. In the case of the latter, Milch ordered that only captured ak pieces be used at the sites, a measure that prevented the further dilution of German air defence resources and saved the best ak guns for the protection of authentic sites. 16 The level of interest in the dummy installations ultimately rested on their effectiveness. In August and September the Luftwaffe calculated that the RAF had dropped 415 high-explosive (HE) bombs, 1607 incendiaries and 376 ares on targets in air district VII. Of this total, 60 HE bombs, 219 incendiaries and 77 ares fell on dummy installations, or 14% of HE bombs and incendiaries and 20% of ares. 17 The initial results seemed promising, and by mid-November the success achieved through the use of the sites resulted in praise from the Reich minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels. Goebbels, writing about the effect of British bombing, noted in a diary entry of 14 November that 'it is apparent that the English have been duped by fake installations to the greatest extent'. 18 Likewise, Sperrle lauded the performance of the sites:
The great signi cance of the established dummy installations in the course of the last weeks especially and distinctly stands out. They Sperrle's commendation followed in the wake of a highly effective week for the dummy installations. Between 4 and 10 November, British bombers released 172 HE bombs and 355 incendiaries over targets within air district VII. Dummy installations absorbed 58 of the bombs and 183 of the incendiaries of the entire RAF effort, or a total of 34% and 51%, respectively. 20 In Augsburg, on the night of 6 November, the fake sites alone received 33% of the high-explosive bombs and 70% of the incendiaries dropped by the RAF bombers. Similarly, in Stuttgart on the night of 8 November, the numbers were almost reversed, with 65% of the high-explosive bombs and 38% of the incendiaries hitting the dummy installations. In contrast, the totals for Munich and Augsburg, on the night of 8 November, proved to be a modest 12% of the number of high-explosive bombs and only 8% of the incendiaries. The Luftwaffe rationalized the low percentage in these areas as a product of too few dummy installations (Munich had only one), and noted that further construction was under way.
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By the summer of 1941 the dummy installations had emerged as an important adjunct to the Reich's air defences. In turn, the success of the dummy installations in the early stages of the war offers another measure for gauging the overall effectiveness of the German groundbased air defence system. Although these sites were not bringing down British bombers, they were in fact achieving the desired effect of substantially diluting the impact of the RAF attacks. Additionally they required few resources and very little effort to maintain. Milch's order to use only captured ak guns meant that the guns and, to some extent, the munitions were also an expendable resource. Also, these sites offered an excellent live-re training ground for inexperienced gun and searchlight crews, as well as recently mobilized reservists.
The improved performance achieved by German anti-aircraft defences in July and August coincided with a change in the RAF's bombing emphasis. In a directive issued on 9 July 1941, Bomber Command restated the objectives of future bombing raids as 'dislocating the German transportation system and destroying the morale of the civilian population as a whole and of the industrial workers in particular'. 22 The RAF's decision to strike at the morale of the civilian population emerged in part in recognition of the abysmal results being achieved by its bomber crews. In August, D.M. Butt released a devastating evaluation of the results of some one hundred RAF bombing raids conducted in the period between 2 June and 25 July 1941. After exam-ining post-strike photographs of the targets, the report concluded that no more than one crew in ve of all aircraft dispatched had dropped their bombs within 5 miles of the correct target. Furthermore, the ight crews had obtained even worse results in the heavily built-up and smog-lled Ruhr, where only one in ten bombers placed their bomb load within 5 miles of the target. 23 The poor accuracy of British bombing in the rst two months of the summer occurred as a result of several factors. First, the British lacked a navigational system that would enable them to locate targets precisely. Second, German ghter and anti-aircraft defences continued to expand while becoming more effective, as indicated by the increasing loss rate suffered by the RAF. By the end of March 1941, bomber losses amounted to a mere 181 aircraft; by the end of June this number had grown to 541 aircraft; and by the end of September the total stood at 1170 aircraft. Admittedly, these losses included non-combat accidents and mishaps, but German air defences still directly or indirectly accounted for the majority of RAF losses in the period. 24 An additional factor that helped to explain the poor results achieved by Bomber Command was the Luftwaffe's continued use of dummy installations to decoy RAF crews away from their intended targets. For example, RAF crews dropped 55% of their high-explosive bombs and 69% of their incendiaries on dummy installations in the vicinity of Stuttgart and Karlsruhe in July 1941. In August, Bomber Command wasted 38% of its high-explosive loads and 31% of its incendiaries on phoney sites within air district VII. 25 In another remarkable example, during a raid against Berlin in 1941, RAF crews dropped 43 times more high-explosive bombs and 47 times more incendiaries on a dummy installation than on the city itself. 26 In the case of Berlin, work crews camou aged major streets and landmarks, thus transforming the aerial view of the city's centre to such an extent as to make visual identication extremely dif cult for the bomber crews, especially in blackout conditions. 27 For example, construction crews built a replica of the famous Brandenburg Gate and erected models of government buildings east of the Spree River in an attempt to deceive RAF bom- bers as to the location of the Wilhelmstrasse, the centre of the Reich government.
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The RAF certainly was not oblivious to the efforts of the Luftwaffe with respect to decoy and deception measures. In fact, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the chief of the air staff, sent Prime Minister Winston Churchill a report in October 1941 discussing the nature of Berlin's air defences. Portal informed the prime minister that 'the large numbers of searchlights at Berlin are intensely dazzling and the Germans are continually improving their elaborate systems of decoys and camou age. For these reasons, crews may take some time in determining their exact position and in deciding on the best run-in to their targets.'
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The dummy installations continued to pay a handsome dividend at relatively little cost into the autumn of 1941. As a result, the Luftwaffe construction crews in air district VII began work on two new sites at the beginning of September. 30 In September 1941 the percentage of all bombs dropped on fake installations in air district VII totalled 53% of all high-explosive bombs and 41% of all incendiaries; in October, 37% of all HE bombs and 28% of all incendiaries; and in November, 28% of all HE bombs and 11% of all incendiaries. 31 The decreasing percentage of bombs dropped on the dummy installations through the autumn of 1941 indicated that the RAF crews had become more pro cient at recognizing the phoney sites. A Luftwaffe after-action report in November remarked on this trend by noting 'the heavy use of parachute ares over the dummy installations is once again noticeable, allowing for the presumption that the enemy is reckoning with such installations and is seeking to identify them'.
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By the summer of 1941 the RAF was well on the way to developing a radio-navigational system to improve bombing accuracy.
33 Despite these efforts, Bomber Command did not correctly identify one dummy installation constructed to simulate the Krupp works near Essen until 1943, by which time they had dropped 64% of all high-explosive bombs and 75% of all incendiaries on the fake factory instead of its authentic counterpart. In addition, Berlin lay beyond the range of the new radio navigation devices, and the 16 dummy sites surrounding the capital were more or less effective throughout the war. 34 the vicinity of Berlin also included fake air elds created in moors or on lakes replete with runway lighting. 35 All in all, the dummy installations continued to bedevil British night missions until late in the war. Goebbels ruefully remarked on the success of the dummy sites in a diary entry of July 1941, by con ding 'We cannot deny the pompous declarations of success by the RAF, because they mostly concern dummy installations. The statistics mentioned by the English are totally grotesque. But perhaps they even believe them themselves. They give us a certain pause to catch our breath.' 36 On 7 September, Goebbels again remarked that his of ce would not deny British claims of bombing destruction in western and north-western Germany because 'the English are for the most part hitting dummy sites'. 37 One Luftwaffe report went so far as to describe the role played by the dummy installations during the build-up of the German night defences as 'decisive'.
38

II
By the summer of 1942 the RAF's increasing success in identifying the dummy sites led the Luftwaffe to pursue new initiatives designed to deceive the bomber crews. In one case British bombers over ew twenty dummy sites in air district VII during the night of 28 August but released only a single high-explosive bomb on a site near Augsburg. Still, even as late as December, an RAF bomber dropped 10 highexplosive bombs and 100 incendiaries on one dummy site. The interrogations of two downed pilots in September produced a mixed evaluation of the sites, with one pilot remarking that the lighting of the dummy sites made them easily discernible, while another pilot described the effectiveness of the sites, especially those north-west of Berlin. 39 The noticeable decrease in the ef cacy of the dummy sites led the Luftwaffe to attempt new methods for decoying the bombers away from their intended targets. For example, the Luftwaffe constructed walled enclosures labelled by the British as ' re sites' in areas near potential RAF targets. These walled enclosures were lled with combustible materials and set alight prior to, or during, an actual bombing raid. At night and from a height of over 10 000 feet, the re sites resembled burning buildings. The re sites were simple but extremely effective decoys. In the wake of a failed raid over the issue of bombs being released over the re sites. In a lengthy harangue, Harris showed his anger with his crews:
It is apparent from the night photographs and from the reports of crews, that almost the whole effort was wasted in bombing large res in the local forests, and possibly decoy res. Nevertheless, in spite of the now incontrovertible evidence that this is what in fact occurred, the reports of the crews on their return from the raid were most de nite in very many cases that they had reached the town and bombed it. ... The cause of this failure is beyond doubt to be found in the easy manner in which crews are misled by decoy res or by res in the wrong place. ... somehow or other we must cure this disease, for it is a disease, of wasting bombs wholesale upon decoy res. 40 An RAF study at the end of the war con rmed Harris's fear and noted that the principal type of decoy used in 1941 and 1942 had been the re site. The study then concluded that, although these sites were often recognized in night photographs, they were still 'frequently effective in diverting a considerable proportion of our attacks'.
41 Despite Harris's admonition to his crews, the re sites would continue to retain much of their effectiveness until the RAF introduced target-marking devices for the Path nder Force in 1943, at which time the German defenders would initiate a new series of countermeasures in an endless game of action and reaction. In any event, the re sites demonstrated the Luftwaffe's renewed success in deception operations versus the bombers, and once again highlighted the importance of examining ground-based air defences in a broader context beyond the simpli ed calculus of ak versus ghters.
As an adjunct to the dummy sites, the Luftwaffe also began to use smoke generators to conceal the primary target and divert the bombers to the fake installations. 42 During the latter half of 1941, smoke generators had proved highly effective in protecting the battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau anchored in the harbour at Brest from RAF bombing raids. 43 Additionally, smoke-generating companies surrounding the oil re nery at Pölitz achieved a 'complete success' in preventing the accurate bombing of the site in December 1942. Likewise, Leroy Newby, a B-24 bombardier, described a raid against Ploesti dur- ing which columns of smoke from dummy res 'fooled' several bomber groups, including his own, to drop over 1000 tons of bombs 'into a sea of white smoke'. During this raid the reduced visibility over the target caused by the smoke coverage also led several groups to proceed to the secondary target. 44 By the end of 1942 the Luftwaffe had eight smoke-generating companies consisting of 500 men; however, by 1945 this number soared to 50 000 men and women serving in 100 smokegenerator companies. 45 The major drawback associated with these units was, however, their demand for 15 000 tons of smoke acid per month, a demand that German industry found impossible to meet as the number of smoke-generator companies skyrocketed. 46 The performance of the smoke-generator companies, like that of the dummy installations, provided yet another example of the effectiveness of ground-based air defences when viewed from a holistic perspective.
III
In a review of bombing operations between 1 February and 18 April 1943, the British Operational Research Section determined that of the 29 major bombing operations carried out against German targets, 'only 3 have achieved complete success, 8 have been partially successful, whilst 15 have been complete failures'. In other words, the ORS identied over one-half of the raids in this period as having been 'complete failures'. The section attributed most of the failures to problems with either the radio navigation system, codename OBOE, or H2S groundmapping radar equipment; however, in ve cases the actions of German ground-based air defences proved decisive. The report noted that 'in at least 5 cases out of the ten which have been investigated in detail it is highly probable that the enemy has directly contributed to the failure of the operation by the use of decoys or smoke screens'. 47 The ORS report in June 1943 also noted that there was some evidence of the use of 'sky marker ares'. 48 For example, during an attack on Bochum in May, Bomber Command aircraft reported seeing red target markers on the ground, despite the fact that Path nder Force (PFF) aircraft had failed to mark the area at the designated time. The Luftwaffe's employment of decoy markers was an issue of extreme importance for RAF bombing operations. Bomber Command rst introduced red target markers for PFF aircraft in a raid against Berlin on the night of 16 January 1943. In turn, target markers greatly reduced the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe's existing decoy re sites. 44 The Luftwaffe, however, quickly adapted to the changed circumstances and by March had constructed decoy rocket-launching sites in the vicinity of the existing re sites. Approximately 20 Luftwaffe personnel operated the sites in 12-hour shifts. When an attack appeared imminent, the Luftwaffe ground crews launched decoy rockets in the general direction of the re sites. The decoy rocket closely simulated the PFF's red target indicator, and the lighting of the re sites offered an added measure for deceiving Bomber Command aircrews. In addition, to decoy rockets the sites also maintained decoy ground ares in a variety of colours. The sites themselves were both easy to conceal and extremely rudimentary, consisting of wooden crates for launching rockets and concrete launch pads of a few square metres. The use of decoy target markers also took advantage of the tendency among aircrews in the bomber stream to drop on the rst target markers or ground res they encountered. This practice arose from the completely natural reaction of the crews to drop their bomb load and leave the target as soon as possible, but the practice also resulted in the continual 'creep back' of the bomb pattern from the original aim point. 49 Despite growing evidence, the RAF proved somewhat unwilling to believe reports that the Luftwaffe was employing decoy target indicators. In fact it was not until September 1944 that military intelligence con rmed the use of decoy target indicators.
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The operation of the decoy target indicator sites was important in several respects. First, the creation of decoy rocket sites, married with the existing re sites, provided a further illustration of the Luftwaffe's ingenuity in the eld of ground-based air defences. Second, these sites required little maintenance, proved dif cult to identify from the air and offered high returns on a minimal investment. Even if the sites proved successful in diverting only a portion of the attacking force, they had served their purpose well. Third, the sites, though not by intent, may have played a signi cant role in inducing the 'creep back' phenomenon associated with many Bomber Command raids during the war. Finally, the sites demonstrated the cat-and-mouse game of move and countermove being played by both sides in the air war over Germany.
In addition to the decoy markers, the Luftwaffe also continued to rely on traditional camou age and decoy methods. For example, British intelligence identi ed a 'dummy town' located north-west of Berlin described as 'a realistic reconstruction by dummy lights, factories and marshalling yards of a nearby town or factory target'. such site north of Berlin near the town of Frohnau was completely constructed out of canvas and plywood. 52 In another case the RAF veried the existence of a decoy lake at Wedel near Hamburg altered to resemble the port city's famous Außen Alster. In this case the deception was believed to have contributed to fooling a 'large proportion' of aircraft during a raid on the night of 3 March 1943. In fact an ORS report noted that 'It seems likely that the whole village of Wedel has been made into a decoy for Hamburg, which it resembles somewhat in shape, and the possibility that such decoys exist for other German cities should not be overlooked'. 53 It is unclear what opinion the citizens of Wedel held concerning these measures, but certainly their countrymen in Hamburg appreciated any measure designed to provide them with some respite from RAF bombing. Despite some success, Bomber Command's increasing use of H2S ground-mapping radar reduced the general effectiveness of sites in western Germany, leading to their deactivation at the end of 1943. 54 In the end, passive decoy measures by themselves could not prove decisive over the long term; nevertheless these measures had constituted an important but auxiliary method for degrading the effectiveness of Allied bombing in 1941-43.
IV
Throughout 1944 the Luftwaffe continued to recognize the value of dummy installations and decoy measures as an important adjunct to the ak gun defences. The growing Allied practice of relying on radar bombing during periods of poor weather led to the introduction of an ingenious countermeasure in the form of radar-re ective oats. The early versions of Allied H2S/H2X ground-mapping radar were limited in their ability to distinguish between terrain features; however, large bodies of water offered an excellent contrast with land features, and provided navigators with important information to x their positions. Berlin, a major Allied target, is surrounded by a number of lakes that greatly facilitated navigation by the bombers when an overcast covered the city. In order to confuse Allied navigators, the Luftwaffe constructed cruciform-shaped metal plates on wooden oats and placed them in rows across lakes on the western approaches to the capital. 55 These oats in turn re ected radar energy back to Allied planes providing an image that made one lake appear as two or more 52 bodies of water. 56 Post-war investigation teams from the American military described this deception measure as 'quite successful'. 57 Throughout 1944 the Luftwaffe also continued to employ decoy target indicators to divert Bomber Command aircraft from their objectives. An Operational Research Section report of 14 April 1944 warned that 'a large volume of evidence has now been collected which shows beyond reasonable possibility of doubt that the enemy is making attempts to divert our attacks from his cities by the use of decoy TI markers, and that his efforts have been meeting with some degree of success.' The report also remarked on the decreased effectiveness of German re sites, but cautioned that 'used in conjunction with decoy TI's, and possibly smoke screens as well, they can form an effective decoy system. ... [and] it appears probable that he [the enemy] is planning a rapid expansion of these decoy activities in the near future.' Finally, in order to counter the German effort, the ORS report suggested the development of a new target marker that could not be easily duplicated. 58 In addition to the decoy measures involving radar-re ective oats and decoy target indicators, the Luftwaffe constructed dummy ak batteries and dummy air elds in the vicinity of important urban and industrial targets. On the phoney air elds, damaged aircraft or fabric and wood models provided effective decoys. Likewise, the Luftwaffe set up phoney anti-aircraft batteries to conceal the departure of ak defences from speci c areas. 59 In the case of the dummy ak sites, one 8th Air Force ak report observed, 'It is possible that the enemy is deceiving us to some extent by leaving behind dummy equipment whenever he abandons or temporarily leaves unoccupied a gun position.' This report then continued, 'A possible example of this is at Bielefeld where photographs still show 10 heavy guns although no Flak has been encountered there during the past month even in visual conditions. On the same basis it is possible that some of the guns in the Ruhr have been removed.'
60 By concealing the removal of ak guns from speci c sites, the Luftwaffe hoped to prevent Allied ak intelligence of cers from noticing the shift in gun batteries from secondary objects to the protection of high priority areas during the last year of the war.
In conjunction with the dummy air elds and ak sites, the Luftwaffe continued to rely heavily on dummy installations throughout 1944 to divert Allied bombers from their intended targets. The worsening petroleum crisis caused by the Allied bombing of oil facilities led the Luftwaffe to focus on the construction of dummy installations in the vicinity of oil re neries and the Reich's critical synthetic oil plants. For example, the Luftwaffe constructed two separate dummy facilities near Ploesti in an effort to fool Allied bombers. These dummy sites were located approximately 8 miles north-west and 7 miles east of the real oil facilities. 61 In another example, decoy plants surrounding the synthetic oil plant at Leuna successfully diverted a total of 4550 bombs away from the actual site. 62 In fact, more bombs hit the dummy sites than the real facility in seven of the rst eight attacks aimed at the plant. 63 Likewise, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey team that inspected the synthetic oil plant at Meerbeck remarked that a dummy plant located some 3 miles from the main plant proved 'very effective until May 1944'. In the case of Meerbeck, the RAF dropped 23 926 high-explosive bombs and 103 743 incendiary bombs during 41 attacks, but after the war the survey team found evidence of only 328 bomb craters within the plant area. 64 While the incendiaries would not have produced a crater, the fact that little more than 1% of the highexplosive bombs fell within the plant area highlighted the RAF's difculties with night bombing accuracy against point targets, and provides a strong indicator as to the effectiveness of the nearby dummy site.
By mid-1944 attempts to protect German industry also included extensive use of camou age as well as dispersing industrial facilities and moving them underground. 65 In the face of the increasing Allied aerial bombardment, the government ordered the dispersal of 'vital industries' to less threatened areas in March 1944. 66 Likewise, the British raid against Peenemünde in August 1943 had started a movement to put V-2 missile production underground. By 1944 the infamous Buchenwald satellite camp, Dora, employed thousands of forced labourers and prisoners of war working and living in atrocious conditions beneath the earth. 67 In the face of increasing American attacks on the German aircraft industry, Hitler tasked the Organization Todt with the construction of subterranean aircraft factories. 68 Camou age, dispersal and the movement of critical industries underground were important passive defence measures that complemented efforts associated with the dummy installations. In the nal analysis, the innovative decoy and deception measures introduced by the Luftwaffe throughout the war demonstrated a continuing facility for adaptation and ingenuity within the ground-based air defence force. The success of these forces was one of the major achievements of the air defence effort.
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By the end of 1944 the Luftwaffe's dummy sites, deception measures and smoke generators had provided the Third Reich with a string of Pyrrhic victories. The overwhelming Allied aerial assault had smashed the German oil industry and was laying waste to the Reich's transportation system. Clearly, by this stage of the war, passive defences alone could not stem the ood of British and American strategic and tactical aircraft visiting destruction on the German homeland. Still, the dummy sites married with deception measures demonstrated the important role of passive defences when used in conjunction with active defences. By 1945 these measures achieved only marginal effects; however, these defences nonetheless had made important contributions to the protection of German industry and urban areas in the rst four years of the war. On the one hand, the relatively modest costs associated with these efforts highlighted the bene ts that could be achieved by deception. On the other hand, the dynamic nature of these defences and their ability to adapt in the face of Allied countermeasures aptly illustrated the dialectic battle between offence and defence during the Second World War. In the end the dummy sites could not prevent the obliteration of German industry and urban centres, but they did show that on numerous occasions as Allied bombers were hitting their marks, they were in fact missing their targets. 68 
